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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/JSMaP

e-ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 01 Issue 05

June 2015

Available online: http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 240

The Propriety of Section 5(3) 0f Petroleum Profit Tax Act (Ppta) In

Relation To the Freedom of Information Act (Foia); Officialsecrets Act

(Osa); Evidence Act 2011(As Amended):

O. N. Ewelike

LEGAL PRACTITIONER

dozyulyke@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This work may well be described as a child of

necessity because it was inspired by the

passing of the Freedom of Information Bill

(FOIB) into Law and the amendment of the

Evidence Act which subsequently raised

salient issues worthy of discourse. The

Freedom of Information Bill now Act was

introduced following the clamour of

journalists in Nigeria over their difficulties in

obtaining relevant information from the public

sector and the deliberate suppression of

information by the Government, thereby

promoting accountable governance and the

consequent hardship in the attempt to make

the government accountable. This work is

thereby an incursion into the relevant

provisions of the aforementioned enactments

and also including Official Secrets Act, and

Petroleum Profit Tax ACT analysing and

comparing the provisions of the later with the

other enactments in determining its propriety.

Section 5(3) of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act

made provisions which seemed or actually in

contradiction with the other enactments

already mentioned above and this paper has

attempted a comprehensive outlook and

examination on the matter.

INTRODUCTION

Following the amendment of the recent

amendment of the Evidence Act and the

passing of the Freedom of Information Bill

into Law and the existing provisions of the

Petroleum Profit Tax Act; have raised

salient issues worthy of discourse. This is

not to say that the amendments and

enactment is a futile attempt, it of course

serves its purpose. The purpose of this

work is to highlight the discrepancies

existing between these laws and the

possible legal effect.

A comparative analysis of the relevant

sections of the above Acts would be

adopted to address the above issue.

ANALYSES OF THE RELEVANT

PROVISIONS

section 5(3) (Petroleum Profit Tax Act,

2004) provides thus: “No person

appointed under or employed in carrying

out the provisions of this Act shall be

required to produce in any court, any

return, document or assessment to divulge

or communicate to any court any matter or

thing coming under his notice in the

performance of his duties under this Act

except as may be necessary for the

purpose of carrying into effect the

provisions of this Act, or in order to

institute a prosecution, or in the course of

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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/JSMaP

e-ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 01 Issue 05

June 2015

Available online: http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 241

a prosecution for any offence committed in

relation to tax”

Section 3(1) (a) of the said Act provides

thus: “the due administration of this Act

and the tax shall be under the care and

management of the Board which may do

all such acts as may be deemed necessary

and expedient for the assessment and

collection of the tax and shall account for

all amounts so collected in a manner to be

prescribed by the minister”

The “Board” as mentioned in the

foregoing provision was defined in S.2 of

the same Act to mean “the Federal Board

of Internal Inland Revenue established and

constituted in accordance with” Section

1(the Companies Income Tax Act, 2004)

Section 1 (1) (Companies Income Tax,

2004) provides that “there shall continue to

be a Board of which the official name shall

be the Federal Board of Inland Revenue

(in this Act referred to as the “board”)

whose operational arm shall be called and

known as the Federal Inland Revenue

Service (in this Act referred to as

“Service”)” while sub (2) provides for the

constitution of the board.

In Relation to the Freedom of

Information Act 2011 (FOIA):

Since the provisions of the FOIA relates to

public institutions it would be expedient to

give the definition of public institution.

Thus, Section 31(FOIA, 2011) defines

“public institution to mean any legislative,

executive, judicial, administrative, or

advisory body of government, including

boards, bureau, committees, or

commissions, of the state, and any

subsidiary body of those bodies including

but not limited to committees and

subcommittees which are supported in

whole or in part by public fund or which

expends public fund and private bodies

providing public services, performing

public functions or utilizing public funds”.

Therefore, in consideration of the above

provisions of PPTA, CITA, FOIA, and

parity of reasoning since Federal Board of

Inland Revenue is a government agency

saddled with the responsibility of

administering tax and run with public

fund and in addition to the express

mention of ‘board’ in the above definition.

Hence it qualifies as a public institution.

Section 1 (FOIA, 2011) establishes

the right of any individual to access or

request for information, whether or not

contained in a written form, which is in the

custody or possession of any public

official, agency or institution howsoever

described. Notwithstanding anything

contained in any other Act. In other words

the foregoing provision grants individuals

the ultimate right to any information held

by public institutions albeit there is an

exception to it. The exceptions to the

above general rules are provided in

Sections 11-20 (FOIA, 2011). The section

relevant to the discourse is Section 15 (1)

(a) (FOIA, 2011) which provides thus:

Public institutions shall deny an

application for information that contains

inter alia commercial or financial

information obtained from a person or

business where such trade secrets or

information are proprietary, privileged or

confidential or where such disclosure may

cause harm to the interest of the third

party. Provided that nothing in this

subsection shall be construed as

preventing a person or business from

consenting to disclosure.

Subsection (4) of the same Act further

provides that public institution shall

disclose any information described in

subsection (1) where the disclosure would

be in the public interest and if the public

interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs

in importance any financial loss or gain

to, or prejudice the competitive position of

or interference with contractual or other

negotiations of a third party,

The foregoing provision operates to

qualify the provisions of Section 5 (3)

(Petroleum Profit Tax Act, 2004) giving

circumstances where such information

must be disclosed; in other words it is an

extension of the limit of disclosure to only

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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/JSMaP

e-ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 01 Issue 05

June 2015

Available online: http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 242

tax matters and proceedings concerning

tax offence under the said Act. The

question now arises since the provisions in

both the PPTA and FOIA are enactments

of the National Assembly which of them

will prevail in the event of conflict? By

reference to the proviso in Section 1 (1)

(FOIA, 2011) which states

“notwithstanding anything contained in

any other Act, Law or regulation of the...”

and in the absence of any such proviso in

Section 5 (3) (Petroleum Profit Tax Act,

2004), it follows that the FOIA overrides

the said provision of PPTA. Furthermore,

applying the principle of “repeal by

implication” in the constitutional rule of

interpretation which states that where a

later provision or statute is inconsistent

with an earlier provision of a statute, there

is a legal presumption that the later has

modified or amended the earlier provision

or statute; this was upheld in the case of

(Abacha v. Fawehinmi, 2000)

Therefore the gamut of the entire argument

is that Section 5 (3) (Petroleum Profit Tax

Act, 2004) created a rule and Section 15

(1) (a) & (4) (FOIA, 2011) made an

exception to it.

In Relation to the Official Secret Act

(OSA):

Section 1 (1) (Official Secrets Act, 2004)

makes it an offence for a person to transit

any classified matter to a person whom he

is not authorised on behalf of the

government; or transmits or obtains,

reproduces or retains, any classified matter

which he is not authorised on behalf of the

government to transmit, obtain, reproduce,

or retain. In as much as the argument

proffered above applies mutatis mutandis

to have an overriding effect on the

provisions of OSA. In addition Section 28

(1) (FOIA, 2011) discountenances the

above provision by stating thus,

the fact that any information in the custody

of a public institution is kept by that

institution under security classification or

is classified document written within the

meaning of the Official Secrets Act does

not preclude it from being disclosed

pursuant to an application for disclosure

thereof under the provisions of this Act,

but in every case the public institution to

which the application is made shall decide

whether such information is of a type

referred to in Sections 11- 21 of the Act.

In other words the position of the FOIA

still prevails.

In Relation to the Evidence Act 2011 (As

Amended):

Section 191 (The Evidence Act, 2011)

which dealt with ‘official communication’

provides that: “no public official shall be

compelled to disclose communications

made to him in evidence when he

considers that the public interest would

suffer by this disclosure.”

Provided that the public official concerned

shall, on the order of the court, disclose to

the judge alone in chambers the substance

of the communication in question... this

shall be done in accordance with Section

36(4) (The Constitution, 1999)

In other words, the proviso in the

foregoing provision qualifies the

incapability of the public official to

disclose information stating circumstances

whereby he may be compelled to give the

information as evidence. In contrasting the

foregoing provision with the provisions of

Section 15 (1) (a) (FOIA, 2011) it seems to

be in tandem with the provisions of the

first arm of Section 191 (The Evidence

Act, 2011) in the sense that both precludes

a public institutions or its official from

disclosing the said information. (Note that

public official by implication means a

person representing a public institution).

But subsection (4) of section 15 (The

FOIA, 2011) further makes an exception to

the provisions of the former section (i.e.

the 1st arm of section 191 of Evidence Act)

“that is where the public interest would

suffer for the disclosure” by stating inter

alia ... that where the disclosure will be in

public interest and if the public interest in

the disclosure clearly outweighs the