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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning
Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/JSMaP
e-ISSN: 2395-0463
Volume 01 Issue 05
June 2015
Available online: http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 240
The Propriety of Section 5(3) 0f Petroleum Profit Tax Act (Ppta) In
Relation To the Freedom of Information Act (Foia); Officialsecrets Act
(Osa); Evidence Act 2011(As Amended):
O. N. Ewelike
LEGAL PRACTITIONER
dozyulyke@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
This work may well be described as a child of
necessity because it was inspired by the
passing of the Freedom of Information Bill
(FOIB) into Law and the amendment of the
Evidence Act which subsequently raised
salient issues worthy of discourse. The
Freedom of Information Bill now Act was
introduced following the clamour of
journalists in Nigeria over their difficulties in
obtaining relevant information from the public
sector and the deliberate suppression of
information by the Government, thereby
promoting accountable governance and the
consequent hardship in the attempt to make
the government accountable. This work is
thereby an incursion into the relevant
provisions of the aforementioned enactments
and also including Official Secrets Act, and
Petroleum Profit Tax ACT analysing and
comparing the provisions of the later with the
other enactments in determining its propriety.
Section 5(3) of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act
made provisions which seemed or actually in
contradiction with the other enactments
already mentioned above and this paper has
attempted a comprehensive outlook and
examination on the matter.
INTRODUCTION
Following the amendment of the recent
amendment of the Evidence Act and the
passing of the Freedom of Information Bill
into Law and the existing provisions of the
Petroleum Profit Tax Act; have raised
salient issues worthy of discourse. This is
not to say that the amendments and
enactment is a futile attempt, it of course
serves its purpose. The purpose of this
work is to highlight the discrepancies
existing between these laws and the
possible legal effect.
A comparative analysis of the relevant
sections of the above Acts would be
adopted to address the above issue.
ANALYSES OF THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS
section 5(3) (Petroleum Profit Tax Act,
2004) provides thus: “No person
appointed under or employed in carrying
out the provisions of this Act shall be
required to produce in any court, any
return, document or assessment to divulge
or communicate to any court any matter or
thing coming under his notice in the
performance of his duties under this Act
except as may be necessary for the
purpose of carrying into effect the
provisions of this Act, or in order to
institute a prosecution, or in the course of
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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning
Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/JSMaP
e-ISSN: 2395-0463
Volume 01 Issue 05
June 2015
Available online: http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 241
a prosecution for any offence committed in
relation to tax”
Section 3(1) (a) of the said Act provides
thus: “the due administration of this Act
and the tax shall be under the care and
management of the Board which may do
all such acts as may be deemed necessary
and expedient for the assessment and
collection of the tax and shall account for
all amounts so collected in a manner to be
prescribed by the minister”
The “Board” as mentioned in the
foregoing provision was defined in S.2 of
the same Act to mean “the Federal Board
of Internal Inland Revenue established and
constituted in accordance with” Section
1(the Companies Income Tax Act, 2004)
Section 1 (1) (Companies Income Tax,
2004) provides that “there shall continue to
be a Board of which the official name shall
be the Federal Board of Inland Revenue
(in this Act referred to as the “board”)
whose operational arm shall be called and
known as the Federal Inland Revenue
Service (in this Act referred to as
“Service”)” while sub (2) provides for the
constitution of the board.
In Relation to the Freedom of
Information Act 2011 (FOIA):
Since the provisions of the FOIA relates to
public institutions it would be expedient to
give the definition of public institution.
Thus, Section 31(FOIA, 2011) defines
“public institution to mean any legislative,
executive, judicial, administrative, or
advisory body of government, including
boards, bureau, committees, or
commissions, of the state, and any
subsidiary body of those bodies including
but not limited to committees and
subcommittees which are supported in
whole or in part by public fund or which
expends public fund and private bodies
providing public services, performing
public functions or utilizing public funds”.
Therefore, in consideration of the above
provisions of PPTA, CITA, FOIA, and
parity of reasoning since Federal Board of
Inland Revenue is a government agency
saddled with the responsibility of
administering tax and run with public
fund and in addition to the express
mention of ‘board’ in the above definition.
Hence it qualifies as a public institution.
Section 1 (FOIA, 2011) establishes
the right of any individual to access or
request for information, whether or not
contained in a written form, which is in the
custody or possession of any public
official, agency or institution howsoever
described. Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other Act. In other words
the foregoing provision grants individuals
the ultimate right to any information held
by public institutions albeit there is an
exception to it. The exceptions to the
above general rules are provided in
Sections 11-20 (FOIA, 2011). The section
relevant to the discourse is Section 15 (1)
(a) (FOIA, 2011) which provides thus:
Public institutions shall deny an
application for information that contains
inter alia commercial or financial
information obtained from a person or
business where such trade secrets or
information are proprietary, privileged or
confidential or where such disclosure may
cause harm to the interest of the third
party. Provided that nothing in this
subsection shall be construed as
preventing a person or business from
consenting to disclosure.
Subsection (4) of the same Act further
provides that public institution shall
disclose any information described in
subsection (1) where the disclosure would
be in the public interest and if the public
interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs
in importance any financial loss or gain
to, or prejudice the competitive position of
or interference with contractual or other
negotiations of a third party,
The foregoing provision operates to
qualify the provisions of Section 5 (3)
(Petroleum Profit Tax Act, 2004) giving
circumstances where such information
must be disclosed; in other words it is an
extension of the limit of disclosure to only
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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning
Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/index.php/JSMaP
e-ISSN: 2395-0463
Volume 01 Issue 05
June 2015
Available online: http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 242
tax matters and proceedings concerning
tax offence under the said Act. The
question now arises since the provisions in
both the PPTA and FOIA are enactments
of the National Assembly which of them
will prevail in the event of conflict? By
reference to the proviso in Section 1 (1)
(FOIA, 2011) which states
“notwithstanding anything contained in
any other Act, Law or regulation of the...”
and in the absence of any such proviso in
Section 5 (3) (Petroleum Profit Tax Act,
2004), it follows that the FOIA overrides
the said provision of PPTA. Furthermore,
applying the principle of “repeal by
implication” in the constitutional rule of
interpretation which states that where a
later provision or statute is inconsistent
with an earlier provision of a statute, there
is a legal presumption that the later has
modified or amended the earlier provision
or statute; this was upheld in the case of
(Abacha v. Fawehinmi, 2000)
Therefore the gamut of the entire argument
is that Section 5 (3) (Petroleum Profit Tax
Act, 2004) created a rule and Section 15
(1) (a) & (4) (FOIA, 2011) made an
exception to it.
In Relation to the Official Secret Act
(OSA):
Section 1 (1) (Official Secrets Act, 2004)
makes it an offence for a person to transit
any classified matter to a person whom he
is not authorised on behalf of the
government; or transmits or obtains,
reproduces or retains, any classified matter
which he is not authorised on behalf of the
government to transmit, obtain, reproduce,
or retain. In as much as the argument
proffered above applies mutatis mutandis
to have an overriding effect on the
provisions of OSA. In addition Section 28
(1) (FOIA, 2011) discountenances the
above provision by stating thus,
the fact that any information in the custody
of a public institution is kept by that
institution under security classification or
is classified document written within the
meaning of the Official Secrets Act does
not preclude it from being disclosed
pursuant to an application for disclosure
thereof under the provisions of this Act,
but in every case the public institution to
which the application is made shall decide
whether such information is of a type
referred to in Sections 11- 21 of the Act.
In other words the position of the FOIA
still prevails.
In Relation to the Evidence Act 2011 (As
Amended):
Section 191 (The Evidence Act, 2011)
which dealt with ‘official communication’
provides that: “no public official shall be
compelled to disclose communications
made to him in evidence when he
considers that the public interest would
suffer by this disclosure.”
Provided that the public official concerned
shall, on the order of the court, disclose to
the judge alone in chambers the substance
of the communication in question... this
shall be done in accordance with Section
36(4) (The Constitution, 1999)
In other words, the proviso in the
foregoing provision qualifies the
incapability of the public official to
disclose information stating circumstances
whereby he may be compelled to give the
information as evidence. In contrasting the
foregoing provision with the provisions of
Section 15 (1) (a) (FOIA, 2011) it seems to
be in tandem with the provisions of the
first arm of Section 191 (The Evidence
Act, 2011) in the sense that both precludes
a public institutions or its official from
disclosing the said information. (Note that
public official by implication means a
person representing a public institution).
But subsection (4) of section 15 (The
FOIA, 2011) further makes an exception to
the provisions of the former section (i.e.
the 1st arm of section 191 of Evidence Act)
“that is where the public interest would
suffer for the disclosure” by stating inter
alia ... that where the disclosure will be in
public interest and if the public interest in
the disclosure clearly outweighs the
