Page 1 of 10

Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at

http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/

ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 01 Issue 09

October 2015

Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 457

Transition from Socialism to Capitalism Market

SHILPA RANI, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

GOVT.GIRLS COLLEGE FOR WOMEN, BHODIAKHERA (FATEHABAD)

EMAIL-ID: shilpakathuria4@gmail.com

Abstract

The transition from socialism to capitalism poses severe problems of financial management that

have yet to be resolved in principle. One unfortunate consequence is continual financial change

as socialist economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe attempt reform. Inflation first

accompanies and then undermines attempts to decentralize decision-making. But why should

the transition from central planning to a market economy be inflationary? Understanding the

system of financial control in the preexisting regime of "classical" socialism is the key to

understand what might go wrong in the transition.

Introduction

Under classical socialism, all the means of

production —industrial and agricultural—are

state-owned. Output targets, input levels,

wages and prices are all set by a system of

central planning. Accordingly, I shall

identify:

1) how domestic fiscal and monetary

processes interact with the central planning

in the classical socialist economy;

2) why this mechanism for securing

domestic financial control and avoiding

inflation under classical socialism tends to

break down when decentralization begins

and central planning is weakened.

3) how domestic tax and monetary

arrangements might be managed to keep

the average price level stable as the market

prices of individual goods and services

become free to fluctuate. After sufficient

domestic financial control is secured,

Perspectives and starting from the classical

socialist regime of foreign exchange

inconvertibility and state trading.

4) how explicit policies governing tariffs and

foreign exchange convertibility could parallel

and complement the evolving restraints on

money and credit in domestic commerce.

Because is is impractical to restructure all

aspects of the economy simultaneously,

there is a natural order of economic

liberalization. If liberalization from classical

socialism is to succeed, moves to dismantle

the apparatus of central planning, decontrol

prices, privatize property, and so on need to

be supported by a proper sequence of

fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange

measures. In this short essay, only the

broad outlines of such a financial order can

be sketched; a fuller treatment is now

available in McKinnon (1991).

Review of Literature

No law establishing a personal income tax

is necessary if all enterprises essentially

withhold household income at its source. As

long as the state owns the capital stock, it

must set or limit the wages of workers and

managers to ensure that enterprises, on

average, do generate cash surpluses.

Otherwise, if managers or workers' councils

can determine their own wages with an

Page 2 of 10

Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at

http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/

ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 01 Issue 09

October 2015

Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 458

indirect claim on the firm's physical capital,

they will pay themselves "excessive" wages

that tend to decapitalize the enterprise

(Hinds, 1990). With the necessary wage

controls already in place, maintaining a

parallel system of personal income taxation

is an unnecessary expense.

Under classical socialism, therefore,

enterprise deposits with the state bank

cannot even be spent for domestic goods

and services without permission, nor are

enterprises allowed to hold "cash"—coin

and currency that could be spent without

being traced. This internal or "commodity

inconvertibility" of enterprise money in

socialist economies is much more restrictive

than mere inconvertibility into foreign

exchange (McKinnon, 1979, Ch. 3), which

of course is a more common phenomenon

in nonsocialist economies as well. Within a

classical socialist economy like the Soviet

Union's, therefore, we have two monetary

circuits: the (blocked) deposits of

enterprises held with the state bank- sometimes in several designated

accounts—and households' coin and

currency. Households can spend their cash

freely for goods and services

John Williamson (1991) further clarifies

various concepts of internal and external

currency convertibility. 110 Journal of

Economic Perspectives without getting

permission from the government (if they can

find them in the shops) or deposit it into

personal savings accounts that can be later

withdrawn without restraint.3 To prevent an

overhang (at fixed retail prices) of

domestically convertible household money

which leads to more than the normal

"tautness" in aggregate demand in the

socialist economy, the amount of the

blocked enterprise money which is

converted through wage or other payments

for personal services must be strictly limited.

Indeed, having the state bank carefully

monitor the conversion from enterprise to

household money complements the system

of wage controls. By itself, the Stalinist

system of enterprise money and credit is

essentially passive on both the loan and

deposit sides of the state bank's balance

sheet. On the loan side, enterprises are

restricted neither by interest rates (which

are kept trivially low) nor by fixed credit

lines. If any enterprises had insufficient

funds on hand to purchase supplies as

allowed under the plan, it could borrow

without restraint from the state bank.

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under

Classical Socialism

In the classical socialist economy,

the financial system has two essential

features that differentiate it from its capitalist

counterpart. First, the system of taxation is

largely implicit and uncodified. Second, the

system of money and credit for enterprises

is entirely passive. In the absence of central

planning, the monetary system itself does

not restrain the ability of enterprises to bid

for scarce resources.

Consider the fiscal system first.

Because the government owns all the

industrial and agricultural property,

surpluses are extracted from enterprises

(and indirectly from households) with

relatively little codification in formal tax law.

For example, no system of consumer

excises (sales taxes) need be formally

codified if the preexisting system of price

controls keeps the retail cost of consumer

"luxuries"—liquor, tobacco, automobiles,

and so on—arbitrarily high. Then

enterprises producing these goods would

run large cash surpluses, which would

Page 3 of 10

Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at

http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/

ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 01 Issue 09

October 2015

Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 459

revert to the state as government revenue.

Of course, the government can also lose

revenue if prices of some goods, say basic

foods, are set below their costs of

production. The implicit consumer excise

tax rate on these goods is then negative.

Under classical socialism, having enterprise

"profits"—really residual cash surpluses

which don't allow for depreciation of fixed

capital or the drawing down of inventories—

simply revert to the state is not an inefficient

method of taxation. (The state must then

provide financing for authorized new

investments by recycling funds back to

enterprises.) In the presence of centralized

price controls, output targets, and input

allocations, which enterprises generate

surpluses and which generate deficits is

largely arbitrary anyway. Thus,

appropriating cash surpluses is the only

feasible method for the government to tax

enterprises. As long as all decisions for

allocating resources are actually made by

the central planning agency, seizing

enterprise profits ex post facto need not be

particularly damaging to managerial

incentives. In contrast, generalized business

taxes that work well in a liberalized market

context, say a value-added tax, might not

even be collectible in a classical socialist

economy, when price controls prevent the

tax from being shifted forward to the final

user. Similarly, levying a formal gross

turnover tax directly on enterprises (as

socialist governments do) may simply

reduce residual profits, which would

otherwise revert to the state. As long as the

final prices of goods sold are controlled by

the government, whether revenue is

formally collected from a turnover tax or

from residual profit remittances to the state

is a distinction without a difference. Even

under centralized price and output controls,

enterprise surpluses remain somewhat

uncertain. Variability in the technology,

uncertainty in the availability of inputs,

unknowns in inventory accumulation, and so

on make enterprise cash surpluses difficult

to predict. Hence, enforcing revenue

collection in the absence of formally codified

tax law requires that these surpluses remain

"blocked" as they are generated.

The Breakdown of Financial Control

in the Transition

Once liberalization begins, the formal

apparatus of central planning is weakened

as decision-making and effective property

rights devolve more to the (state-owned)

enterprises themselves, and perhaps to a

newly enfranchised private or cooperative

sector. Price controls may or may not be

removed in this transitional period.

However, by giving up control over state

property, the government in effect gives

away its tax base! Because of the implicit

nature of the old system of taxation, no

formal internal revenue service exists for

clawing back revenue from entities that are

no longer controlled by the government.

Enterprises can no longer so easily be

used as revenue (cash) cows, or as

vehicles for indirectly taxing households.

The result in the Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe, as well as China and many of the

smaller socialist economies of Asia, is a

sharp decline in the revenue of the

consolidated government as liberalization

proceeds. For example, government

revenue in China had fallen from over 34

percent of GNP in 1978 to just 19 percent in

1989. The case of the Soviet Union is

illustrated in Table 1.