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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning
Available at
http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/
ISSN: 2395-0463
Volume 01 Issue 09
October 2015
Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 457
Transition from Socialism to Capitalism Market
SHILPA RANI, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
GOVT.GIRLS COLLEGE FOR WOMEN, BHODIAKHERA (FATEHABAD)
EMAIL-ID: shilpakathuria4@gmail.com
Abstract
The transition from socialism to capitalism poses severe problems of financial management that
have yet to be resolved in principle. One unfortunate consequence is continual financial change
as socialist economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe attempt reform. Inflation first
accompanies and then undermines attempts to decentralize decision-making. But why should
the transition from central planning to a market economy be inflationary? Understanding the
system of financial control in the preexisting regime of "classical" socialism is the key to
understand what might go wrong in the transition.
Introduction
Under classical socialism, all the means of
production —industrial and agricultural—are
state-owned. Output targets, input levels,
wages and prices are all set by a system of
central planning. Accordingly, I shall
identify:
1) how domestic fiscal and monetary
processes interact with the central planning
in the classical socialist economy;
2) why this mechanism for securing
domestic financial control and avoiding
inflation under classical socialism tends to
break down when decentralization begins
and central planning is weakened.
3) how domestic tax and monetary
arrangements might be managed to keep
the average price level stable as the market
prices of individual goods and services
become free to fluctuate. After sufficient
domestic financial control is secured,
Perspectives and starting from the classical
socialist regime of foreign exchange
inconvertibility and state trading.
4) how explicit policies governing tariffs and
foreign exchange convertibility could parallel
and complement the evolving restraints on
money and credit in domestic commerce.
Because is is impractical to restructure all
aspects of the economy simultaneously,
there is a natural order of economic
liberalization. If liberalization from classical
socialism is to succeed, moves to dismantle
the apparatus of central planning, decontrol
prices, privatize property, and so on need to
be supported by a proper sequence of
fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange
measures. In this short essay, only the
broad outlines of such a financial order can
be sketched; a fuller treatment is now
available in McKinnon (1991).
Review of Literature
No law establishing a personal income tax
is necessary if all enterprises essentially
withhold household income at its source. As
long as the state owns the capital stock, it
must set or limit the wages of workers and
managers to ensure that enterprises, on
average, do generate cash surpluses.
Otherwise, if managers or workers' councils
can determine their own wages with an
Page 2 of 10
Journal for Studies in Management and Planning
Available at
http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/
ISSN: 2395-0463
Volume 01 Issue 09
October 2015
Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 458
indirect claim on the firm's physical capital,
they will pay themselves "excessive" wages
that tend to decapitalize the enterprise
(Hinds, 1990). With the necessary wage
controls already in place, maintaining a
parallel system of personal income taxation
is an unnecessary expense.
Under classical socialism, therefore,
enterprise deposits with the state bank
cannot even be spent for domestic goods
and services without permission, nor are
enterprises allowed to hold "cash"—coin
and currency that could be spent without
being traced. This internal or "commodity
inconvertibility" of enterprise money in
socialist economies is much more restrictive
than mere inconvertibility into foreign
exchange (McKinnon, 1979, Ch. 3), which
of course is a more common phenomenon
in nonsocialist economies as well. Within a
classical socialist economy like the Soviet
Union's, therefore, we have two monetary
circuits: the (blocked) deposits of
enterprises held with the state bank- sometimes in several designated
accounts—and households' coin and
currency. Households can spend their cash
freely for goods and services
John Williamson (1991) further clarifies
various concepts of internal and external
currency convertibility. 110 Journal of
Economic Perspectives without getting
permission from the government (if they can
find them in the shops) or deposit it into
personal savings accounts that can be later
withdrawn without restraint.3 To prevent an
overhang (at fixed retail prices) of
domestically convertible household money
which leads to more than the normal
"tautness" in aggregate demand in the
socialist economy, the amount of the
blocked enterprise money which is
converted through wage or other payments
for personal services must be strictly limited.
Indeed, having the state bank carefully
monitor the conversion from enterprise to
household money complements the system
of wage controls. By itself, the Stalinist
system of enterprise money and credit is
essentially passive on both the loan and
deposit sides of the state bank's balance
sheet. On the loan side, enterprises are
restricted neither by interest rates (which
are kept trivially low) nor by fixed credit
lines. If any enterprises had insufficient
funds on hand to purchase supplies as
allowed under the plan, it could borrow
without restraint from the state bank.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under
Classical Socialism
In the classical socialist economy,
the financial system has two essential
features that differentiate it from its capitalist
counterpart. First, the system of taxation is
largely implicit and uncodified. Second, the
system of money and credit for enterprises
is entirely passive. In the absence of central
planning, the monetary system itself does
not restrain the ability of enterprises to bid
for scarce resources.
Consider the fiscal system first.
Because the government owns all the
industrial and agricultural property,
surpluses are extracted from enterprises
(and indirectly from households) with
relatively little codification in formal tax law.
For example, no system of consumer
excises (sales taxes) need be formally
codified if the preexisting system of price
controls keeps the retail cost of consumer
"luxuries"—liquor, tobacco, automobiles,
and so on—arbitrarily high. Then
enterprises producing these goods would
run large cash surpluses, which would
Page 3 of 10
Journal for Studies in Management and Planning
Available at
http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/
ISSN: 2395-0463
Volume 01 Issue 09
October 2015
Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 459
revert to the state as government revenue.
Of course, the government can also lose
revenue if prices of some goods, say basic
foods, are set below their costs of
production. The implicit consumer excise
tax rate on these goods is then negative.
Under classical socialism, having enterprise
"profits"—really residual cash surpluses
which don't allow for depreciation of fixed
capital or the drawing down of inventories—
simply revert to the state is not an inefficient
method of taxation. (The state must then
provide financing for authorized new
investments by recycling funds back to
enterprises.) In the presence of centralized
price controls, output targets, and input
allocations, which enterprises generate
surpluses and which generate deficits is
largely arbitrary anyway. Thus,
appropriating cash surpluses is the only
feasible method for the government to tax
enterprises. As long as all decisions for
allocating resources are actually made by
the central planning agency, seizing
enterprise profits ex post facto need not be
particularly damaging to managerial
incentives. In contrast, generalized business
taxes that work well in a liberalized market
context, say a value-added tax, might not
even be collectible in a classical socialist
economy, when price controls prevent the
tax from being shifted forward to the final
user. Similarly, levying a formal gross
turnover tax directly on enterprises (as
socialist governments do) may simply
reduce residual profits, which would
otherwise revert to the state. As long as the
final prices of goods sold are controlled by
the government, whether revenue is
formally collected from a turnover tax or
from residual profit remittances to the state
is a distinction without a difference. Even
under centralized price and output controls,
enterprise surpluses remain somewhat
uncertain. Variability in the technology,
uncertainty in the availability of inputs,
unknowns in inventory accumulation, and so
on make enterprise cash surpluses difficult
to predict. Hence, enforcing revenue
collection in the absence of formally codified
tax law requires that these surpluses remain
"blocked" as they are generated.
The Breakdown of Financial Control
in the Transition
Once liberalization begins, the formal
apparatus of central planning is weakened
as decision-making and effective property
rights devolve more to the (state-owned)
enterprises themselves, and perhaps to a
newly enfranchised private or cooperative
sector. Price controls may or may not be
removed in this transitional period.
However, by giving up control over state
property, the government in effect gives
away its tax base! Because of the implicit
nature of the old system of taxation, no
formal internal revenue service exists for
clawing back revenue from entities that are
no longer controlled by the government.
Enterprises can no longer so easily be
used as revenue (cash) cows, or as
vehicles for indirectly taxing households.
The result in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, as well as China and many of the
smaller socialist economies of Asia, is a
sharp decline in the revenue of the
consolidated government as liberalization
proceeds. For example, government
revenue in China had fallen from over 34
percent of GNP in 1978 to just 19 percent in
1989. The case of the Soviet Union is
illustrated in Table 1.
