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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at

http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/

ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 03 Issue 10

September 2017

Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 151

The Importance of Public Goods Provision to the

Communities and the Associated Problems

Imuetinyan Press John Ugiagbe (Ph.D., Cert ED)

Department of Business Administration, College of Business and Management Studies,

Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State, Nigeria.

Abstract:

The initial theory on public goods was by Kenneth

Arrow, Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson

(1954-1955). Arrows (1972) discourse on the role of

the public and private sector and Musgrave (1959)

book on public finance provided the frame work to

what has become known as the proper role of the

state in the economy. The importance of public goods

provision in any society cannot be underestimated by

any responsible government because a non –

provision of it could mean the people would live in

life of penury of perpetual deprivation of an abject

poverty. Unfortunately public goods provision is a

difficult phenomenon for any government to provide

partly because it is very sumptuous to provide and

also because of free riders problem resulting from

the unwillingness of some users of the goods to pay

for it and also because of jurisdictional spill over

effects. This article is based on desk research using

secondary sources of information. It is argued that

the provision of public goods while remaining the

preserve mostly of the government can be a complex

issue and that public goods provision is mostly a

budgetary fiscal decision and that the size of the

budget coupled with the will of political leaders and

the wiliness of the electorate to pay for it is very

necessary and crucial to the adequate and amount of

provision of public goods and services. .

Keywords

Public Goods Provision, Communities, public

finance, budgetary fiscal

Introduction

The provision of public goods and services by sub

government is an essential and integral aim of fiscal

federal practices. Arrow (1972) discourse on the role

of public sector identifies three roles for the public

sector: firstly, correcting marketing failure, secondly,

ensuring an equitable distribution of income and

thirdly, seeking to maintain macroeconomic stability.

The provision of public goods is essential to alleviate

poverty, which is my objective in this article. This

theoretical frame work was basically a Keynesian

one which advocates for states to intervene in

economic affairs. Thus the government is

expected to step in where market mechanisms have

failed due to various forms of public goods

characteristics. Economists teach us that public

goods would be under provided if they are left to

private individuals because the gain or benefits

accruable to him/her would be far lower than the

benefits to wider society. The theory focuses on

situation where different levels of government

provide different levels of outputs of public goods

“for those goods whose benefits were encompassing

the geographical scope of their jurisdiction“(Oates,

2004. 5). Such situation according to Olson (1969)

came to be known as “perfect matching” or fiscal

equivalence.

Public Good

In a general context public goods are defined by

Hyman (1993) as goods and services “for which

there is non-rivalry in consumption and non- excludable” p.130. This non-rivalry connotation

according to Hyman (1993) means that many

consumers can enjoy a given quantity of public

goods and at the same time there would be no

decrease in the amount enjoyed by them. Examples

are national defence, television, and radio

transmission. Therefore even when there is an

increase in population, the reduction brought about

by the increase will not lead to anybody suffering in

the reduction of the quantity of the goods and

services. The non-excludability means that it will be

too expensive and also not feasible to exclude people

who may not wish to pay for the benefits they enjoy

from a given amount of service.

However according to Peterson (2007) geography

can place a limit to the non-excludability of public

goods, hence they differ by the user capacities.

Therefore public goods can be divided into different

categories: global, international, public, national,

regional and local public goods. This is why Oates

(1972) enthuses that not all public goods have similar

spatial characteristics. Some, such as defence,

benefits the entire country, others such as regional

transportation systems or forestry services benefits

regions. When “the jurisdiction that determines the

level of the provision of each public good includes

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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

Available at

http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/

ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 03 Issue 10

September 2017

Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 152

precisely the set of individuals who consume the

good” there is “perfect correspondence” in the

provision of public goods (Oates 1972, p.34)

International public goods are most universal by

its geographical coverage and all people can benefit

anywhere in the world, such as international defence

pact, peace keeping mission, knowledge, clean

environment and economic stability. National public

goods are goods that are not excludable within a

nation’s boundary such as national defence, National

legal Aid System, and social security. Local public

goods are goods, which are limited in their capacity

to the local jurisdictional boundary. Thus, Oates

(1999) says that: “each level of government,

possessing complete knowledge of the tastes of its

constituents and seeking to maximize their welfare,

would provide the pareto-efficient level of out-put ...

and would finance this through benefit pricing”

(pp.34-35). Oate’s normative policy conclusion is

that “for a public good – the consumption of which is

defined over geographical subsets of the total

population, and for which the costs of providing each

level of out-put of the good in each jurisdiction are

the same for the central or the respective local

governments- it will always be more efficient (or at

least as efficient) for local governments to provide

the pareto-efficient levels of out-put for their

respective jurisdictions than for the central

government to provide any specified and uniform

level of out-put across all jurisdictions” (Oates 1972,

p.35). Also traditional public finance theory argues

that the “government level, which is much closer to

the people of their respective jurisdictions, has a

better knowledge of both preferences and costs”

(Oates, 1999, p.1123). Therefore, the jurisdictional

level with best information should supply the

respective public goods. Consequently the rationality

following this notion is that central government to

provide nation’s public goods and services, local to

provide local public goods and services and regional

to provide regional public goods respectively. This is

similar to the economic theory of the law of

comparative advantage and also the principle of

subsidiary.

People tend to hide their true preferences for

public goods and services because of its non-rival

and non-excludability. When individual receives

public goods and services whether he/she pays for it

or not he/she is tempted not to contribute to the

production of it. This situation many researchers, for

example Aiyede (2009) called a ‘free rider’ problem,

which justifies the government provisions of the

public goods, which can only be financed through

the consumers paying taxes that would ensure that

everyone pays in accordance to individual

circumstances, regardless of consumption and

income.

Local public goods, the benefits are only non-rival

to the local population who live in certain

geographical area. These goods are best and most

efficiently provided when it is financed by the local

government, example refuse collection, traffic

control, public sanitation, water and sewage services,

local policing, roads as well as education, especially

primary education. The main advantage of this posits

Tanzi (1996) is that it allows governments to provide

goods and services in accordance to the variation, in

tastes and costs condition. Under these circumstances

where decision is made at a local level in a federal

system to provide public goods and services and

financed with local taxes, such a situation will be

superior to a centralized system of public goods

provisions.

From the above discussion one can conclude that

public goods and services benefit those citizens in

the jurisdiction where they are residents. But quite

often than not, public supply also has beneficial

effects on citizens of neighbouring jurisdictions

which called spill over effects and according to

decentralization theorem, Oates (`1972) says that in

case of spill over a centralized system is preferred

and without spill over’s decentralized systems are

superior. But traditional theories argue that the

centralized provision of public goods is insensitive to

the preferences of the local citizen.

This discussion implies that public goods could be

efficient if different jurisdictional levels do supply

the public goods with different capacities, steered by

citizens’ preferences. Therefore national government

should provide national policy and provide an

efficient level of national public goods for their

constituencies. Thus the volume of public

expenditures will be determined by the quantities of

the public goods supplied, which are determined by

the citizens’ preferences. This result can only be

achieved through a successful implementation of

political and decentralization of a meaningful nature

allowing elections to take place at different

jurisdictional levels and providing the legislative

power as well as the revenue sovereignty to the sub- national levels. This will allow all constitutional

matters as well as decisions regarding who is

responsible for what provision and revenues

assignment arrangements should be implemented.

Jurisdictional structure

The literature on public goods has demonstrated

that services should be provided and the costs shared

are in line with the preferences of the residents

within the relevant benefit region. Thus, local public

goods should be provided, and more efficiently

supplied by lower level jurisdictions, consequently

would lead to the concept of optimum community.

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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning

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http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/

ISSN: 2395-0463

Volume 03 Issue 10

September 2017

Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 153

The design by Musgrave (1989) of the community

size, states that in an optimal fiscal community the

marginal savings per capita service costs should be

equal to the marginal per capita crowding costs for

the services subject only to spatial limitations of

benefits. Therefore according to this model the multi

fiscal units are different in their size and regional

scope; consequently some goods are national while

others are typically local.

The researcher has so far assumed that the

benefits of a particular public goods and services are

best provided by local subunits and are limited to the

space of the providing jurisdiction, and therefore the

benefits accruing from such provisions are confined

within the space of the providing jurisdiction. But

this assertion is not entirely true because of the spill

over effect mentioned above because in the real

world the benefits and costs are overlapped between

jurisdictions which could result in insufficient

provision of public goods and services but one that

can be corrected by central government’s grant.

Mobility of Citizens

Citizens make their political decisions within the

jurisdiction in which they live. A political

jurisdiction is a defined area in which individual

make collective choice regarding publicly provided

services. In an ideal situation market mechanism

should reveal preferences for public goods but if this

fails political process such as democratic voting

should reveal consumers’ preferences for public

goods and define fiscal resources for service

delivery. In this situation only citizens of that

jurisdiction can participate in the election, which are

affected by the provision of local public goods and

share the cost together of providing those goods and

services.

Tiebout (1956) substantiated this notion of public

goods provision by developing a community model,

which stated that expenditure and taxes are quite

differentiated among local political jurisdictions and

that a quasi-market process can solve the public

goods problem for particular jurisdiction. The model

assumes that all citizens are fully mobile within the

communities and that they have full information

about the budgets of nearby or alternative

jurisdiction. Tiebout (1956) has this to say: “spatial

mobility provides the local public goods counterpart

to the private market’s shopping trip--- just as the

consumer may be visualized as a walking to a private

market place to buy his goods, the prices of which

set, will place him in the position walking to a

community where the prices (taxes) of community

services are set” (p.422).

Invariably, individuals are ‘voting with their feet’

and would like to settle or resettle in the community

that they can gain more from in taxes and public

goods and services. The larger communities would

try to dissuade people from coming into their

communities and the smaller one would attempt to

attract emigration into their communities. This

competition amongst communities will result in

efficient solution, which is noticed in perfect

competition market. However, in the real world this

model does provide a perfect description because of

spill over problem emanating from inter-jurisdictions

due to problem with choices of residential

jurisdiction for voters. The spill over of costs and

benefits can also produce assessment problems for

local governments because of inaccurate reflection of

the costs for services and taxes, which would make

competition among local governments less effective.

Public Choice and Fiscal Policy

The demand for public goods and services

Petersen and Mueller (1999) is not a function or

determinant of the market, therefore, budgetary is

determined within the political process for the

preferences of public goods to be revealed.

Consequently public choice can be made through

elections where each individual has one vote in

democratic society. Economists would argue that

rationally, individual would choose the level of

public goods supply, which exactly equalizes the

marginal benefit of the public goods with the

marginal cost (individual tax yields). In a democratic

society, Osaghae (1996) the prevailing collective

acceptable norm is majority voting or rule that has

two forms: direct and representative democracy. It is

also that majority rule will produce a unique political

equilibrium at the most preferred median outcome.

However this condition of prevailing equilibrium

would not occur under certain circumstances,

especially when two or more alternative issues exist.

This model of political behaviour enthuse

Patersen and Mueller (1999) demonstrates that

political parties attempt to maximize votes where as

models of bureaucratic behaviour presume that

bureaucrats tend to maximize the size of their

budget. Interest groups also influence the political

outcomes, seeking to increase the subsidies to their

constituencies. Consequently, equilibrium is a

dependent of bureaucrats, interest groups and

politicians. Hence enthuse, Petersen and Mueller

(1999) that the outcome will not be efficient but

however voting is a second best solution for the

preferences revelation of public goods in a

democratic society. Decentralization will strengthen

citizens’ participation and control of their financial

institutions in the use of public goods. It will also

strengthen politicians’ responsibility and improves

citizen’s participation on budgetary decisions. The

benefits accrues would be similar to the market

pricing, which enables voters a proper evaluation of