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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning
Available at
http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/
ISSN: 2395-0463
Volume 03 Issue 10
September 2017
Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 151
The Importance of Public Goods Provision to the
Communities and the Associated Problems
Imuetinyan Press John Ugiagbe (Ph.D., Cert ED)
Department of Business Administration, College of Business and Management Studies,
Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State, Nigeria.
Abstract:
The initial theory on public goods was by Kenneth
Arrow, Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson
(1954-1955). Arrows (1972) discourse on the role of
the public and private sector and Musgrave (1959)
book on public finance provided the frame work to
what has become known as the proper role of the
state in the economy. The importance of public goods
provision in any society cannot be underestimated by
any responsible government because a non –
provision of it could mean the people would live in
life of penury of perpetual deprivation of an abject
poverty. Unfortunately public goods provision is a
difficult phenomenon for any government to provide
partly because it is very sumptuous to provide and
also because of free riders problem resulting from
the unwillingness of some users of the goods to pay
for it and also because of jurisdictional spill over
effects. This article is based on desk research using
secondary sources of information. It is argued that
the provision of public goods while remaining the
preserve mostly of the government can be a complex
issue and that public goods provision is mostly a
budgetary fiscal decision and that the size of the
budget coupled with the will of political leaders and
the wiliness of the electorate to pay for it is very
necessary and crucial to the adequate and amount of
provision of public goods and services. .
Keywords
Public Goods Provision, Communities, public
finance, budgetary fiscal
Introduction
The provision of public goods and services by sub
government is an essential and integral aim of fiscal
federal practices. Arrow (1972) discourse on the role
of public sector identifies three roles for the public
sector: firstly, correcting marketing failure, secondly,
ensuring an equitable distribution of income and
thirdly, seeking to maintain macroeconomic stability.
The provision of public goods is essential to alleviate
poverty, which is my objective in this article. This
theoretical frame work was basically a Keynesian
one which advocates for states to intervene in
economic affairs. Thus the government is
expected to step in where market mechanisms have
failed due to various forms of public goods
characteristics. Economists teach us that public
goods would be under provided if they are left to
private individuals because the gain or benefits
accruable to him/her would be far lower than the
benefits to wider society. The theory focuses on
situation where different levels of government
provide different levels of outputs of public goods
“for those goods whose benefits were encompassing
the geographical scope of their jurisdiction“(Oates,
2004. 5). Such situation according to Olson (1969)
came to be known as “perfect matching” or fiscal
equivalence.
Public Good
In a general context public goods are defined by
Hyman (1993) as goods and services “for which
there is non-rivalry in consumption and non- excludable” p.130. This non-rivalry connotation
according to Hyman (1993) means that many
consumers can enjoy a given quantity of public
goods and at the same time there would be no
decrease in the amount enjoyed by them. Examples
are national defence, television, and radio
transmission. Therefore even when there is an
increase in population, the reduction brought about
by the increase will not lead to anybody suffering in
the reduction of the quantity of the goods and
services. The non-excludability means that it will be
too expensive and also not feasible to exclude people
who may not wish to pay for the benefits they enjoy
from a given amount of service.
However according to Peterson (2007) geography
can place a limit to the non-excludability of public
goods, hence they differ by the user capacities.
Therefore public goods can be divided into different
categories: global, international, public, national,
regional and local public goods. This is why Oates
(1972) enthuses that not all public goods have similar
spatial characteristics. Some, such as defence,
benefits the entire country, others such as regional
transportation systems or forestry services benefits
regions. When “the jurisdiction that determines the
level of the provision of each public good includes
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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning
Available at
http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/
ISSN: 2395-0463
Volume 03 Issue 10
September 2017
Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 152
precisely the set of individuals who consume the
good” there is “perfect correspondence” in the
provision of public goods (Oates 1972, p.34)
International public goods are most universal by
its geographical coverage and all people can benefit
anywhere in the world, such as international defence
pact, peace keeping mission, knowledge, clean
environment and economic stability. National public
goods are goods that are not excludable within a
nation’s boundary such as national defence, National
legal Aid System, and social security. Local public
goods are goods, which are limited in their capacity
to the local jurisdictional boundary. Thus, Oates
(1999) says that: “each level of government,
possessing complete knowledge of the tastes of its
constituents and seeking to maximize their welfare,
would provide the pareto-efficient level of out-put ...
and would finance this through benefit pricing”
(pp.34-35). Oate’s normative policy conclusion is
that “for a public good – the consumption of which is
defined over geographical subsets of the total
population, and for which the costs of providing each
level of out-put of the good in each jurisdiction are
the same for the central or the respective local
governments- it will always be more efficient (or at
least as efficient) for local governments to provide
the pareto-efficient levels of out-put for their
respective jurisdictions than for the central
government to provide any specified and uniform
level of out-put across all jurisdictions” (Oates 1972,
p.35). Also traditional public finance theory argues
that the “government level, which is much closer to
the people of their respective jurisdictions, has a
better knowledge of both preferences and costs”
(Oates, 1999, p.1123). Therefore, the jurisdictional
level with best information should supply the
respective public goods. Consequently the rationality
following this notion is that central government to
provide nation’s public goods and services, local to
provide local public goods and services and regional
to provide regional public goods respectively. This is
similar to the economic theory of the law of
comparative advantage and also the principle of
subsidiary.
People tend to hide their true preferences for
public goods and services because of its non-rival
and non-excludability. When individual receives
public goods and services whether he/she pays for it
or not he/she is tempted not to contribute to the
production of it. This situation many researchers, for
example Aiyede (2009) called a ‘free rider’ problem,
which justifies the government provisions of the
public goods, which can only be financed through
the consumers paying taxes that would ensure that
everyone pays in accordance to individual
circumstances, regardless of consumption and
income.
Local public goods, the benefits are only non-rival
to the local population who live in certain
geographical area. These goods are best and most
efficiently provided when it is financed by the local
government, example refuse collection, traffic
control, public sanitation, water and sewage services,
local policing, roads as well as education, especially
primary education. The main advantage of this posits
Tanzi (1996) is that it allows governments to provide
goods and services in accordance to the variation, in
tastes and costs condition. Under these circumstances
where decision is made at a local level in a federal
system to provide public goods and services and
financed with local taxes, such a situation will be
superior to a centralized system of public goods
provisions.
From the above discussion one can conclude that
public goods and services benefit those citizens in
the jurisdiction where they are residents. But quite
often than not, public supply also has beneficial
effects on citizens of neighbouring jurisdictions
which called spill over effects and according to
decentralization theorem, Oates (`1972) says that in
case of spill over a centralized system is preferred
and without spill over’s decentralized systems are
superior. But traditional theories argue that the
centralized provision of public goods is insensitive to
the preferences of the local citizen.
This discussion implies that public goods could be
efficient if different jurisdictional levels do supply
the public goods with different capacities, steered by
citizens’ preferences. Therefore national government
should provide national policy and provide an
efficient level of national public goods for their
constituencies. Thus the volume of public
expenditures will be determined by the quantities of
the public goods supplied, which are determined by
the citizens’ preferences. This result can only be
achieved through a successful implementation of
political and decentralization of a meaningful nature
allowing elections to take place at different
jurisdictional levels and providing the legislative
power as well as the revenue sovereignty to the sub- national levels. This will allow all constitutional
matters as well as decisions regarding who is
responsible for what provision and revenues
assignment arrangements should be implemented.
Jurisdictional structure
The literature on public goods has demonstrated
that services should be provided and the costs shared
are in line with the preferences of the residents
within the relevant benefit region. Thus, local public
goods should be provided, and more efficiently
supplied by lower level jurisdictions, consequently
would lead to the concept of optimum community.
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Volume 03 Issue 10
September 2017
Available online: http://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/JSMaP/ P a g e | 153
The design by Musgrave (1989) of the community
size, states that in an optimal fiscal community the
marginal savings per capita service costs should be
equal to the marginal per capita crowding costs for
the services subject only to spatial limitations of
benefits. Therefore according to this model the multi
fiscal units are different in their size and regional
scope; consequently some goods are national while
others are typically local.
The researcher has so far assumed that the
benefits of a particular public goods and services are
best provided by local subunits and are limited to the
space of the providing jurisdiction, and therefore the
benefits accruing from such provisions are confined
within the space of the providing jurisdiction. But
this assertion is not entirely true because of the spill
over effect mentioned above because in the real
world the benefits and costs are overlapped between
jurisdictions which could result in insufficient
provision of public goods and services but one that
can be corrected by central government’s grant.
Mobility of Citizens
Citizens make their political decisions within the
jurisdiction in which they live. A political
jurisdiction is a defined area in which individual
make collective choice regarding publicly provided
services. In an ideal situation market mechanism
should reveal preferences for public goods but if this
fails political process such as democratic voting
should reveal consumers’ preferences for public
goods and define fiscal resources for service
delivery. In this situation only citizens of that
jurisdiction can participate in the election, which are
affected by the provision of local public goods and
share the cost together of providing those goods and
services.
Tiebout (1956) substantiated this notion of public
goods provision by developing a community model,
which stated that expenditure and taxes are quite
differentiated among local political jurisdictions and
that a quasi-market process can solve the public
goods problem for particular jurisdiction. The model
assumes that all citizens are fully mobile within the
communities and that they have full information
about the budgets of nearby or alternative
jurisdiction. Tiebout (1956) has this to say: “spatial
mobility provides the local public goods counterpart
to the private market’s shopping trip--- just as the
consumer may be visualized as a walking to a private
market place to buy his goods, the prices of which
set, will place him in the position walking to a
community where the prices (taxes) of community
services are set” (p.422).
Invariably, individuals are ‘voting with their feet’
and would like to settle or resettle in the community
that they can gain more from in taxes and public
goods and services. The larger communities would
try to dissuade people from coming into their
communities and the smaller one would attempt to
attract emigration into their communities. This
competition amongst communities will result in
efficient solution, which is noticed in perfect
competition market. However, in the real world this
model does provide a perfect description because of
spill over problem emanating from inter-jurisdictions
due to problem with choices of residential
jurisdiction for voters. The spill over of costs and
benefits can also produce assessment problems for
local governments because of inaccurate reflection of
the costs for services and taxes, which would make
competition among local governments less effective.
Public Choice and Fiscal Policy
The demand for public goods and services
Petersen and Mueller (1999) is not a function or
determinant of the market, therefore, budgetary is
determined within the political process for the
preferences of public goods to be revealed.
Consequently public choice can be made through
elections where each individual has one vote in
democratic society. Economists would argue that
rationally, individual would choose the level of
public goods supply, which exactly equalizes the
marginal benefit of the public goods with the
marginal cost (individual tax yields). In a democratic
society, Osaghae (1996) the prevailing collective
acceptable norm is majority voting or rule that has
two forms: direct and representative democracy. It is
also that majority rule will produce a unique political
equilibrium at the most preferred median outcome.
However this condition of prevailing equilibrium
would not occur under certain circumstances,
especially when two or more alternative issues exist.
This model of political behaviour enthuse
Patersen and Mueller (1999) demonstrates that
political parties attempt to maximize votes where as
models of bureaucratic behaviour presume that
bureaucrats tend to maximize the size of their
budget. Interest groups also influence the political
outcomes, seeking to increase the subsidies to their
constituencies. Consequently, equilibrium is a
dependent of bureaucrats, interest groups and
politicians. Hence enthuse, Petersen and Mueller
(1999) that the outcome will not be efficient but
however voting is a second best solution for the
preferences revelation of public goods in a
democratic society. Decentralization will strengthen
citizens’ participation and control of their financial
institutions in the use of public goods. It will also
strengthen politicians’ responsibility and improves
citizen’s participation on budgetary decisions. The
benefits accrues would be similar to the market
pricing, which enables voters a proper evaluation of
