Page 1 of 6

European Journal of Business &

Social Sciences

Available at https://ejbss.org/

ISSN: 2235-767X

Volume 07 Issue 05

May 2019

Available online:https://ejbss.org/ P a g e | 639

Central Asia In Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Ramatullaev Muhammad Rozimbetovich,

Independent applicant of the University

of World Economy and Diplomacy

Abstract

The article examines the relations of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (IRP) with

the countries of Central Asia (CA), the main factors that contribute to and impede the

development of relations. The analysis of the state and possibilities for the development

of cooperation has made it possible to identify the available potential and to try to

determine further development prospects.

Keywords: foreign policy, "Great Game", "ideological" state, Afghanistan,

Kashmir problem, CASA-1000, TAPI.

The relations of modern Pakistan with the countries of Central Asia have deep

historical roots. It is believed that Buddhism came from the territory of Pakistan from

India to Central Asia and further to China. The Great Silk Road connected South and

Central Asia for hundreds of years. Mutual trade and cultural ties have affected both the

Central and South Asia. Even now, there are many common words in the languages of

the peoples of Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia.

General relations between the regions were largely interrupted during the so- called "Great Game", when the British and Russian empires finally divided the

territories of present-day Pakistan and the Central Asian republicsi

.

The formation of independent Pakistan in 1947 did not lead to the restoration of

ties. First, the Central Asian republics were still separated by the "iron curtain".

Secondly, since the very beginning of the formation of independent states in South

Asia, the USSR has taken a course toward developing relations with India. Pakistan,

however, was viewed by the Kremlin in the Cold War as an ally of the United States.

Consequently, India's presence in Central Asia bears strong "traces" of Soviet

legacy. Tashkent became the center of cooperation. For example, Tashkent hosted the

International Film Festival of Asia and Africa. Uzbekistan and India co-produced films.

In addition, Tashkent has four streets named after Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru,

Rabindranath Tagore and Lal Bahadur Shastri.

At the same time, Pakistan's presence was primarily reflected in the meeting in

1966 of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan

Page 2 of 6

European Journal of Business &

Social Sciences

Available at https://ejbss.org/

ISSN: 2235-767X

Volume 07 Issue 05

May 2019

Available online:https://ejbss.org/ P a g e | 640

in Tashkent in signing a joint declaration that completed the full-scale armed conflict

between the two South Asian countries.

Therefore, by the time of the formation of independent states in Central Asia,

Pakistan had to build relations practically from scratch, and relations with Central

Asian countries had become a relatively new direction of foreign policy.

The Central Asian policy of Pakistan should be viewed through the prism

of factors that determine the country's foreign policy vector. According to experts,

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan can be described as an "ideological" stateii, since

Islam as an ideology has become the main link in the formation of this country

and still retains its significance. This factor determines the Pakistani vision of the

surrounding world and left its imprint on the perception of Central Asia. Thus, at

the final stage of the Cold War, Pakistan became a "key state" ensuring the supply

of forces that were struggling with the "foreign occupation" of Afghanistan. This

allowed the IRP to position itself as the country that played a "special role" in the

defeat of the former USSR in Afghanistan. In addition, since the Afghan conflict

took place at the end of the Cold War, Pakistan claimed its contribution to the

collapse of the USSR and the formation of new independent states in its place.

The Islamic factor affected here in the hopes of "thanking" six new states with a

predominantly Muslim population for helping them to be released from the

"atheistic" USSR and building "special relations" based on Islamic identity.

Islamabad also offered its newly independent states assistance in the

political, economic and humanitarian spheres, including in the field of education

and professional development of employees of state bodies and military

personnel.

At the same time, such an ideological approach proved to be untenable.

The countries of Central Asia have formed secular political systems with a ban on

the formation of religious political parties and movements. "Political Islam" is

perceived as a threat to security, not a path of development. For the Central Asian

states, "Islamic solidarity" should not be politicized, including used to resolve

conflicts.

In addition, the development of relations affects the Indian-Pakistani

competition on the principle of "zero-sum game". The irreconcilable positions of

Delhi and Islamabad with regard to most international problems are also evident

in Central Asia. However, in the Central Asian region this competition is largely

latent due to its peripheral importance for both "players".

At the same time, the capabilities of Pakistan do not allow one to claim the

role of one of the leading "players" in the region to the north of Afghanistan. Even

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Page 3 of 6

European Journal of Business &

Social Sciences

Available at https://ejbss.org/

ISSN: 2235-767X

Volume 07 Issue 05

May 2019

Available online:https://ejbss.org/ P a g e | 641

in the period of relative growth of cooperation in 1992-1996, neither for

Islamabad nor for the Central Asian republics, bilateral relations became a

priority foreign policy direction.

At present, the term "non-initiative" seems to be the best characteristic of

the Central Asian vector of Pakistan's foreign policy. If India denotes its desire to

take a more active position in Central Asia and tries to systematically and

strategically shape its policy in the region through the Connect Central Asia

(2012)iii program and include the region in its "Extended Neighborhood"iv

project, Pakistan is still limited to the available connections. Obviously, it would

be extremely difficult for Islamabad to withstand competition in the region with

other leading powers, especially under conditions of transformation into a "state

with a high level of internal instability and significant external threatsv

."

The development of relations between the IRP and the states of Central

Asia is hampered by such a factor as the situation in Afghanistan. The incessant

conflict, Pakistan's involvement in it and fears of the spread of instability in the

territories of the Central Asian states force Islamabad to approach the

development of relations through the prism of the situation in the IRA.

The actual absence of safe land corridors linking Central and South Asia

reduces the role of Pakistan as a trade and economic partner and transit country

capable of providing the Central Asian republics with the shortest access to sea

routes.

For the Central Asian states, the development of the situation around

Afghanistan is of great importance in ensuring national and regional security. The

ongoing conflict with the potential for the disintegration of this state could lead to

the spread of conflict and the growing threat to regional security in Central Asia.

As the internal situation in Pakistan, the growth of radical Islam and the

number of terrorist acts deteriorate, the problem of regional cooperation, the

development of common approaches in the field of security, are becoming

increasingly relevant. According to the director of the Institute of the Middle East

E.Satanovsky, "the army lost control of the Afghan" Taliban ", some of its

detachments reoriented to Doha and Tehranvi."

At the same time, as shown by attempts to organize international

negotiations with Kabul and the Taliban, in particular in the framework of the

"quadrilateral contact group", Pakistan continues to maintain the role of a "key"

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